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1. Introduction 
 
The ongoing debate on the Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) has frequently been 
characterized by arguments borne of political convenience, self-interest or 
uninformed beliefs. The evidence presented by the EU Commission in support of its 
proposals for an FTT provides a more concrete and fruitful route through the debate. 
The Commission is committed to evidence-based policy making,
1
 and it expended 
considerable energy in producing a vast amount of evidence to back its proposals for 
an FTT. The Impact Assessment published in 2011 alone was made up of 19 
volumes.
2
 This chapter thus joins the debate by simply asking whether this evidence 
is persuasive and makes the case for an FTT. It does so within the framework of a 
three-step policy evaluation of the proposal. First, what are the proposal’s objectives? 
Second, are these objectives justified? Third, is the proposed tax the instrument which 
is best suited to achieve these objectives?  
 
By way of background, it should be remembered that in October 2010 the 
Commission considered the introduction of an FTT and a Financial Activities Tax 
(FAT) in a preliminary examination and concluded that “there is greater potential for 
a Financial Activities Tax at EU-level”.3 It then launched a comprehensive Impact 
Assessment (2011 IA)
4
 into both taxes, the results of which were published together 
with the Proposal of September 28, 2011 (2011 Proposal).
5
 The 2011 Proposal 
explains that, after analysing the FTT and the FAT and various design features, the 
2011 IA “concluded that an FTT was the preferred option.”6 This statement will 
surprise attentive readers of the 2011 IA since the analysis contained therein does not 
obviously lead to this conclusion. In fact, the results of the 2011 IA do not always 
support and indeed partly undermine claims made in the 2011 Proposal as well as in 
                                                        

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2
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5
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6
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the Proposal of February 14, 2013 (2013 Proposal).
7
 Overall, there is a discrepancy 
between the 2011 IA and the Proposals, the former recognising the limitations of its 
analysis and the many drawbacks of the FTT and the latter adopting a more 
enthusiastic approach which often overlooks the issues highlighted in the IA.   
 
Further evidence was provided by the Commission in a series of “Technical Fiches” 
published in spring 2012 and in the Impact Assessment (2013 IA) issued concurrently 
with the 2013 Proposal.
8
 However, the Commission’s main case for an FTT was made 
in the 2011 IA and the two later documents merely build on it. The Technical Fiches 
briefly address some of the concerns raised in relation to the 2011 Proposal, and the 
2013 IA returns to some of these concerns but also seeks to address the issues arising 
from the shift to an enhanced cooperation procedure. One notes a qualitative 
difference in the analysis provided in the 2011 and 2013 IAs. The analysis in the 
former appears to be more balanced and scientific.  
 
The central conclusion of this chapter is that the Commission’s evidence is not 
persuasive and does not make the case for an FTT. Whilst some of the objectives 
pursued by the proposals are reasonable, others are questionable. More importantly, 
the Commission’s evidence does not support the choice of the FTT as the instrument 
which is best suited to achieve these objectives. More targeted and more efficient 
instruments should and could be used to achieve these objectives.  
 
 
2 The Proposals’ objectives 
 
The 2011 Proposal
9
 set out the following objectives for the FTT:  
 
1. to raise revenue from the financial sector, which, in turn was intende:  
1.1. to ensure that financial institutions make a fair and substantial 
contribution to covering the costs of the recent crisis,  
1.2.  to ensure a level playing field with other sectors from a taxation point of 
view (to compensate for under-taxation due to the VAT exemption),  
1.3.  to create a new revenue stream for the EU;  
 
2. to create disincentives for transactions that do not enhance the efficiency of 
financial markets; 
3. to avoid a fragmentation of the internal market that might be caused by 
uncoordinated tax measures of the member states;  
                                                        
7
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4. to demonstrate how an effective FTT can be designed and implemented, 
generating significant revenue and paving the way towards a coordinated 
approach beyond the EU. 
The member states which are participating in the enhanced cooperation procedure 
(“participating member states” – “participating MS”) requested that the proposal for 
an FTT under enhanced cooperation should be based on the objectives of the 2011 
Proposal. The objectives of the 2011 Proposal and those of the 2013 Proposal are thus 
meant to be identical. It is thus interesting to note the following statement in the 2013 
Proposal in relation to objective 2: 
 
 “[t]hese disincentives through taxing certain activities and transactions are 
intended to reinforce the effectiveness of regulatory initiatives presently under 
preparation or having recently been implemented (see footnote 12). For the 
FTT initiative exercising such disincentives has more the character of 
welcome side effects.”10 
 
This statement is surprising given that this objective was previously touted as an 
important objective of the tax and not merely “a welcome side effect”.11 Indeed, when 
explaining to the EU Sub-Committee of the UK House of Lords why the Commission 
favoured an FTT over an FAT despite finding both to be “feasible” Commissioner 
Semeta only mentioned two factors: the revenue raising abilities of the FTT and its 
ability to address the issue of high-frequency trading.
12
  
 
 
3. Are the objectives justified and is the FTT the best-suited instrument to achieve 
them? 
 
3.1. Raising revenue from the financial sector 
 
(a) Specific rationales for raising revenue from the financial sector 
 
 (i) Ensuring that financial institutions make a fair contribution to covering the costs 
of the recent crisis 
 
Here the idea is to claw back some of the money that was spent on rescuing banks 
during the financial crisis and also some of the broader costs associated with it.
13
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Whilst a number of issues need to be kept in mind whilst setting out this objective, 
such as the contributory role played by regulators and economic policy makers, 
overall this justification appears reasonable because financial institutions undoubtedly 
played a significant role in causing the crisis. One can thus turn to the second step in 
the analysis which is that of asking whether the FTT is the instrument which is best 
suited to achieve this objective. For the objective to be met, care must be taken to 
ensure that the incidence of the tax is actually borne by the particular entities from 
which the tax is meant to be clawed back. As will be noted below, FTTs are 
especially problematic in this regard. Given this, it is doubtful whether the FTT will 
have the desired distributional effects. There is the danger that the FTT will be sold to 
the public as a tax which punishes those who are responsible for the crisis while the 
true incidence falls on the consumers of financial services. Other tax instruments such 
as, for instance, the FAT (or at least one version of it) are more likely to be borne by 
those earning rents in the financial sector. Furthermore, in seeking to recover the cost 
of the crisis from the financial sector, one ought to choose the instrument which will 
do so whilst causing the least harm to the economy. As discussed below, there are 
better options than the FTT in this respect.  
 
All in all, the conclusion reached here is that this is a good justification for raising 
further revenue from the financial sector. However, an FTT does not appear to be the 
best available instrument to raise such revenue. 
 
(ii) Ensuring a level playing field with other sectors from a taxation point of view  
 
The central contention here is that the financial sector is under-taxed, relative to other 
sectors of the economy, because certain types of financial services are exempt from 
VAT. If true, this provides another justification for raising further revenue from the 
sector through a new tax. What evidence does the Commission present to back this 
objective?  
 
In some official documents, particularly those meant for consumption by the general 
public and non-experts, the Commission presents supportive evidence without 
hesitation: “[t]he financial sector enjoys a tax advantage of approximately €18 billion 
per year because of VAT exemption on financial services.”14 However, it is well 
known that the overall effect of the VAT exemption is ambiguous. The exemption 
reduces the tax burden on services to consumers but it also increases the tax burden 
on transactions with businesses. Some studies do suggest under-taxation,
15
 however 
they are not without difficulty and so uncertainty does remain around this issue. In 
contrast to the bold claim in the quote above, the 2011 IA states: 
 
“[t]he extent to which applying VAT to the financial sector (and its clients) 
would raise additional tax revenues and – consequently – the extent to which the 
exemption constitutes a tax advantage for the financial sector is an unsettled 
empirical question.”16 
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 European Commission Press Release, “Financial Transaction Tax: Making the financial sector pay 
its fair share”, IP/11/1085, (September 28, 2011).  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/1085 
15 H. Huizinga, “Financial Services—VAT in Europe?”, Economic Policy, October 2002, pp. 499-534. 
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The 2011 IA reviews some estimates of the potential tax advantage and presents a 
new estimate which suggests an advantage in the range of 0.11 per cent and 0.017 per 
cent of GDP. The 2011 IA is careful in stressing that “all these estimates are very 
rough approximations and should be interpreted with caution.”17 It then concludes 
cautiously: “…the VAT exemption for a large share of financial services is an 
important issue. It possibly results in a preferential treatment of the financial sector 
compared with other sectors of the economy as well as in distortions of prices.”18   
 
Since the publication of the 2011 IA, a new study commissioned by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and carried out by another leading tax economist found 
neither under-taxation nor over-taxation.
19
 It is not argued here that this study is 
superior to the previous ones or that the financial sector is under-taxed or over-taxed 
as a result of the VAT exemption. Our understanding of this issue is improving, but at 
this point in time, as the Commission itself noted, this question is still unsettled.  
More importantly, even if the Commission’s evidence unambiguously indicated that 
the sector is under-taxed because of this exemption an FTT would not be the best way 
to correct this.  
 
In fact, the 2011 IA itself states: 
 
“[t]he transaction taxes as discussed in this paper are not really effective to 
compensate for the VAT exemption for mainly two reasons. The major part of 
the exemption is due to the margin based business of the banks when receiving 
deposits and granting credit. The transaction proposals discussed here explicitly 
exempt depositing and loans from the tax base. For this reason the FTT would 
not capture the value-added sufficiently. There is no connection to the EU-VAT 
system, which aims at a neutral and non-cascading taxation and to the value 
added of the services involved in the trading or creation of products. 
The FAT and namely the addition-method FAT could be more effective in 
addressing the VAT exemption in the sense that the tax base has similarities to 
the VAT base. However, the integration of VAT and FAT is complicated and 
poses a number of unresolved problems. 
The ideal solution to address the VAT problem remains to fix the issue within 
the current VAT system.”20 
 
The Commission’s evidence for this objective is thus inconclusive, but even if it were 
certain, the Commission’s own view is that the FTT would be the wrong instrument to 
achieve it.
21
 
 
(iii) To create a new revenue stream for the EU 
                                                        
17
 2011 IA Vol.1, above fn.2, p.14 (emphasis added). 
18
 2011 IA Vol.1, above fn.7, p.15 (emphasis added).  
19
 B. Lockwood, “Estimates from National Accounts Data of the Revenue Effect of Imposing VAT on 
Currently Exempt Sales of Financial Services Companies in the EU” (2011). This study is attached to 
the report PwC, “How the EU VAT exemptions impact the Banking Sector” (2011), available at 
www.pwc.com.  
20
 2011 IA Vol.1, above fn. 2, pp. 34-35 (emphasis added).  
21
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At present it is not clear what use will be made of the funds raised by the FTT, 
although the revenue might be split between the member states and the EU.
22
 The 
Commission certainly views the FTT as a potential new revenue stream for the EU, 
and has suggested an FTT for this purpose in a proposal on own resources for the EU 
issued on June 29, 2011 and amended on November 9, 2011.
23
  
 
Whilst, there are good reasons to reduce the EU’s reliance on contributions by 
member states and replace those contributions with new own sources of funding, it is 
not at all obvious why the EU should be funded by the financial sector to a larger 
extent than by any other sector. One can thus question the choice of any tax on the 
financial sector as a means of achieving this objective. That said, if a tax on the 
financial sector is to be chosen for this purpose, the FTT is not an obvious choice. 
Given the volatility and uncertainty surrounding its tax base, an FTT certainly does 
not constitute an obviously stable source of funding upon which a budget can rely. If 
the objective of the FTT is simply to raise revenue from the financial sector then the 
considerations raised below must be taken into account.  
 
 
(b) General considerations on the FTT as a revenue raiser 
 
Each of the three justifications given by the Commission for raising further revenue 
from the financial sector give rise to specific considerations as to instrument choice. 
We can leave them to one side and consider the FTT as a general revenue raiser. Four 
issues are considered here. These issues are well known, and the arguments 
surrounding them are well rehearsed. The question is whether the Commission’s 
evidence is successful in addressing them. In each of these cases it is striking that the 
2011 and 2013 IA do not seem to offer much support for an FTT.  
 
(i) Threat of avoidance though relocation unless FTT is global 
 
The 2011 IA defines relocation risk broadly as including both “moving the relevant 
activities to jurisdictions where they are taxed less” and also “shifting to 
products/suppliers outside the scope of taxation within the same jurisdiction.”24 In its 
October 2010 Communication the EU Commission concluded: “[i]n the light of the 
analysis undertaken to date, FTT appears less suitable for unilateral introduction at 
EU-level since the risks of relocation are high and would undermine the ability to 
generate revenue.”25 
 
This issue was then considered in some detail in the 2011 IA. After reviewing the 
issue it concluded: 
 
                                                        
22
 2013 Proposal, above fn. 7, p. 15. 
23
 “Proposal for a Council Decision on the system of own resources of the European Union”, 
COM(2011) 510 final, (June 29, 2011). The documents relating to this issue can all be found at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/budget/biblio/documents/fin_fwk1420/fin_fwk1420_en.cfm>. 
24
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25
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“[a]gainst this background, it is difficult to make unequivocal conclusions on 
the exact size of the elasticities and relocation risks (although there are strong 
risks of relocation). Our revenue simulations consider a relocation of 
securities markets by 10%, a relocation of spot currencies by 40% and a 
relocation of derivatives instruments of 70% or 90% …”26  
 
Overall, the predictions are thus rather gloomy, with the forecast on the over the 
counter (OTC) derivative markets being particularly so.
27
 The 2011 IA notes that “the 
application of the tax in this highly mobile market will be difficult and reduce the 
taxable base significantly... the tax base could largely disappear leaving no substantial 
revenue.”28 
The statement cited above betrays recognition of the severity of the relocation 
problem. However, at other points in its documentation the Commission adopts a 
much more optimistic stance. In the 2013 IA the Commission insists that “the risk of 
geographical relocation remains rather limited … so do the benefits”.29 Again, given 
that in its 2011 IA the Commission noted: “if the geographical scope of the tax is 
reduced relocation risk is increased”,30 one might have expected a recognition of the 
increased relocation risk following the shift to enhanced cooperation in the 2013 IA, 
however, this is not forthcoming.  
Despite the Commission’s reassurances, the participating MS clearly retained 
concerns in this respect. In fact, the only instruction given to the Commission in 
preparing the 2013 Proposal, apart from following the 2011 Proposal, was to ensure 
that “evasive actions, distortions and transfers to other jurisdictions are to be 
avoided.”31 The Commission responded by introducing a number of changes aimed at 
improving the robustness of the tax. These included rules closing specific avoidance 
opportunities, a General Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR) and the “issuance principle”.32 
Are the Commission’s optimistic statements, particularly those found in the 2013 IA 
and Proposal, credible? Despite the additional measures adopted, it is unavoidable 
                                                        
26
 2011 IA Vol.1, above fn. 2, p. 47 (emphasis added). The IA goes on to state “[s]uch disappearance 
could be seen as positive if the activities targeted are considered as harmful. To the extent that High- 
Frequency Trading is considered as harmful, one has to bear in mind it is estimated to be about 40% of 
total transactions.” This point is considered below. 
27 
The 2011 IA employs two scenarios to calculate expected FTT revenues with a predicted decrease in 
derivative trading of 70 or 90 per cent, respectively. No explanation is given as to why these two 
numbers are picked. The 2011 IA cites the example of Sweden, where, following the introduction of an 
FTT, the trading in futures on bonds fell by 98 per cent within the first week of the application of the 
tax. In the light of this experience and the fear that the tax base could largely disappear the particular 
figures chosen might be seen as not being large enough. If the Swedish experience is indeed to be taken 
seriously and 98 per cent instead of 70 per cent or 90 per cent of the tax base is lost, this should reduce 
predicted tax revenue 15 or 5-fold respectively.  
28
 2011 IA Vol. 12, above fn. 2, p. 22.  
29
 2013 IA, above fn. 8, p. 49. 
30
 2011 IA Vol. 1, above fn. 2, p. 48. 
31
 2013 IA, above fn. 8, p. 9. 
32
 See J. Englisch, J. Vella and A. Yevgenyeva, “The Financial Transaction Tax Proposal Under the 
Enhanced Cooperation Procedure: Legal and Practical Considerations” (2013) 2 British Tax Review 
223, pp. 226-229. 
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that the FTT will lead to a diversion of institutions, activities and capital from 
participating MS to non-participating MS and non-EU states, which we can here call 
“non-FTT states”.  
As the 2013 IA recognises, financial institutions from participating MS may benefit 
from setting up subsidiaries in non-FTT states, or converting branches in non-FTT 
states to subsidiaries.
33
 Such subsidiaries will be subject to the FTT on transactions 
with entities or individuals established in participating MS as well as transactions 
involving instruments issued in a participating MS. However, such subsidiaries will 
not be subject to the FTT on transactions with entities not established in participating 
MS as long as they do not involve financial instruments issued in participating MS.  
Of course, financial institutions from non-FTT states will continue to trade with 
entities from participating MS and in instruments issued in participating MS, 
however, the considerable benefit of setting up subsidiaries or entities in non-FTT 
States and diverting activities to them is clear. Consider a French bank with a 
subsidiary in London. If the French bank regularly trades with financial institutions 
from London, New York, Hong Kong and all other major financial centres, or indeed 
any entity or individual from non-FTT states, it would benefit considerably by 
carrying out these activities through its London subsidiary. Furthermore, if financial 
institutions from participating MS set up subsidiaries or convert branches into 
subsidiaries in non-FTT states they could similarly trade amongst themselves through 
these subsidiaries rather than through their parent entities in participating MS. Finally, 
there are also benefits for a participating MS financial institution to transact through a 
non-FTT states subsidiary even when transacting with an entity or individual from a 
participating MS, or when trading instruments issued in a participating MS. Related 
transactions, such as hedging in the context of a purchase of shares, can be carried out 
with entities from non-FTT states thus avoiding the tax on those transactions.  
The 2013 IA also recognises that financial institutions from participating MS will 
have incentives to move their headquarters.
34
 By doing so the financial institution 
would avoid the FTT on transactions in which the counterparty is not established in a 
participating MS and the transaction does not involve an instrument issued in a 
participating MS. The branches of the financial institution located in non-FTT states 
will then also avoid the tax to the same extent. 
Financial centres outside participating MS thus stand to gain in terms of the relocation 
of entities or activities. One would expect these gains not to be insignificant. For 
example, most large European financial institutions already have a large presence in 
London and therefore the costs of relocation of some activities may not be that large. 
Whilst the 2013 IA recognises these possibilities, it does not seek to estimate their 
potential cost to participating MS.  
One can also expect capital, as well as entities and activities, to relocate. Take the 
example of a US investor who is choosing between investing in corporate bonds 
issued by a French company or a UK company. Assuming the bonds to be identical in 
all respects save for their susceptibility to the FTT, the FTT could give the US 
investor an incentive to favour the bonds issued by the UK company. On the other 
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 2013 IA, above fn. 8, pp. 42-43.  
34
 2013 IA, above fn. 8, pp. 42-43.  
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hand, if the FTT is priced into the bonds, the FTT would not affect the US investor’s 
preference but it would increase the cost of capital for the French company relative to 
the UK company. Therefore, non-FTT states might benefit from the FTT because of 
the relocation of capital to non-FTT states entities or through the competitive 
advantage of its entities in terms of a lower cost of capital. 
As noted, the 2013 Proposal also introduces a GAAR to address the concerns of 
participating MS with avoidance. The extent to which the GAAR is thought capable 
of addressing “the risk of abuse which could undermine the proper operation” of the 
FTT is unclear.
35
 The design of the GAAR is questionable on a number of grounds. 
Here we focus on a few points relating to its effectiveness. First, employing the 
concept of commercial substance and recharacterising transactions in accordance with 
their economic substance might be especially challenging in the world of financial 
transactions. Second, the intended reach of the GAAR is unclear. Take the example of 
a UK bank wishing to sell shares in a German company to a US bank. This 
transaction is subject to the FTT. However, the same economic effect can be 
reproduced through the purchase and sale of OTC derivatives, which would not be 
subject to the FTT. Is the GAAR intended to catch such transactions? Preventing FTT 
avoidance through the use of OTC derivatives amongst financial intuitions outside 
participating MS appears ambitious. It certainly would give rise to enforcement 
difficulties. Third, the GAAR will not prevent perhaps the most obvious action to 
avoid the payment of the FTT: relocation of headquarters outside participating MS or 
the conversion of branches found in non-FTT states into subsidiaries. 
Overall, the Commission’s statements which recognize the “strong risk of relocation” 
appear to be more credible than the ones which claim that the risk of geographical 
relocation is “rather limited”.  
Of course any tax is subject to the risk of avoidance but some taxes may be less 
susceptible to real relocation and avoidance than others. As we explain below, the 
Commission recognizes that one of these taxes is the FAT. The tax base of the FAT is 
composed of profits and of labour costs. The former component is clearly susceptible 
to profit shifting activities but the latter is certainly less mobile than financial 
transactions. 
 
(ii) Predictable and stable source of revenue 
 
Both the 2011 IA and the 2013 IA
36
 acknowledge that estimating revenues for such 
taxes “is not feasible without a high degree of uncertainty.”37 Nonetheless, at another 
point in its 2013 IA, the Commission makes bold claims on the FTT revenue 
potential. The 2013 IA states: “this analysis found […] very positive effects on public 
finances (additional annual revenue in the order of 0.5% of GDP).”38 
 
The FTT applied to only 11 countries as proposed in the 2013 Proposal is expected to 
raise EUR 34 billion per year. The starting point for this forecast is the calculation 
                                                        
35
 2011 Proposal, above fn. 5, p. 13.  
36
 2013 IA, p. 21.  
37
 2011 IA Vol. 1, above fn. 2, p. 46. 
38 
IA 2013, above fn. 8, p. 16. 
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made for the FTT in the 2011 Proposal. The 2013 IA takes the 2011 estimate and 
scales it by the banking sector’s net operating income of the 11 participating MS. This 
is a very crude approach and the use of such proxies could further affect the 
credibility of the estimate, especially of a specific point estimate.   
 
The uncertainty surrounding the forecasts of FTT revenues has been painfully 
confirmed in the recent introduction of FTTs by Italy and France. In both cases, the 
authorities significantly overestimated potential revenues from their newly-introduced 
taxes. For 2012, the French Treasury collected EUR 245 million on the FTT, instead 
of the anticipated EUR 540 million, that is, only 44 per cent of the initial estimate.
39
 
The French government in its Finance Bill for 2014 (Project de loi de finances pour le 
2014) explains that lower receipts are due to smaller trading volumes (trading 
volumes on Euronext were down 20 per cent in 2012 compared 2011), to an 
overestimation of OTC volumes and finally to an underestimation of exempt trade 
volumes.
40
 It seems that FTT revenues will disappoint in 2013 too. In 2012, the 
government estimated 2013 revenues to be about EUR 1.5 billion but the latest 
estimates suggest a figure close to EUR 690 million. Figures for 2014 are forecast to 
be EUR 701 million, far from the initial predictions of EUR 1.5 billion per year. 
Overall, annual revenues will probably be only around 46 per cent of initially 
forecasted proceeds.  
 
When introduced, the Italian FTT was forecast to raise EUR 1 billion a year but 
between March and October 2013, the tax only raised EUR 159 million.
41
 Even 
considering that the tax had only been in force for 8 months and that the FTT on 
derivatives was effective only from 1 July 2013, the actual proceeds are still 
substantially lower than the forecast.  
 
To be sure, the FTTs adopted in France and Italy are different to the FTT proposed by 
the Commission, however, the French and Italian authorities were aware of these 
differences when producing their estimates. The point here is that tax authorities have 
systematically, greatly overestimated potential revenues from an FTT, not least 
because of the very nature of the tax base. This is a further reason to question the 
choice of an FTT as a revenue raiser.  
 
Other taxes such as the FAT could be better candidates for providing a relatively 
predictable and steady stream of proceeds. For example, the Italian Imposta Regionale 
sulle Attivita’ Produttive (IRAP) which is very similar to an FAT type 1 collects 
considerable proceeds. Figure 1 plots total tax revenues from IRAP over GDP since 
the introduction of the tax in 1997 (the first revenues were collected in 1998). Two 
facts are clear. First, IRAP has raised a large amount of revenues. For the entire 
                                                        
39
 “Project de loi de finances pour le 2014, Rapport économique, social et financier”, (2013). This is 
available at: <http://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/plf-2014-annexe1.pdf>. 
40
 “Project de loi de finances pour le 2014, Évaluation des voies et moyens, Tome I, Recettes”, 
(2013). This is available at:  
<http://www.performance-publique.budget.gouv.fr/farandole/2014/pap/pdf/VMT1-2014.pdf>. 
41
 Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, Dipartimento delle Finanze, “Bollettino delle Entrate 
Tributarie, Gennaio-Ottobre 2013”, (December 2013). This is available at: 
http://www.ilsole24ore.com/pdf2010/Editrice/ILSOLE24ORE/ILSOLE24ORE/Online/_Oggetti_Corre
lati/Documenti/Notizie/2013/12/Bollettino-entrate-Ottobre-2013.pdf.  
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Italian economy, it has raised between EUR 27.7 billion in 1998 and EUR 39.4 billion 
in 2007,
42
 EUR 36.1 billion in 2008 and around EUR 32 billion a year thereafter with 
basic, national rates
43
 varying between 3.9 (after 2008) and 4.25 (before 2008) for the 
non-financial sector and between 3.9 (in 2008 and 2009) and 5.40 (between 1998 and 
2001) for the financial sector.
44
 Second, IRAP receipts have proven to be very stable 
with a ratio of between 2.2 and 2.5 per cent of GDP, at least until 2007, the year when 
the financial crisis first materialized.
45
 Initial forecasts for IRAP revenues in 1998 
were also higher than the actual revenues collected but the forecasting error of about 
22 per cent
46
 was much smaller than that of the French and the Italian FTTs. Such 
underestimation was mainly due to the use of national accounts including an estimate 
for evasion, which is quite substantial for Italy. The forecasting error was not due to 
an unpredicted decline in activities.  
 
 
  Source: OECD Tax Revenues Statistics, accessed January 2013.   
   
 
 
(iii)   In pure revenue-raising terms, there are more efficient instruments than an 
FTT
47
 
 
                                                        
42
 Data are sourced from the European Commission, Taxation and Customs Union Electronic Database: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/gen_info/economic_analysis/tax_st
ructures/2013/ntl_release_2013.xls 
43 
Since 2002, Italian regions can increase or decrease the IRAP rate by one percentage point.   
44
 Unfortunately, we do not have disaggregated data for the financial sector but there is no reason to 
believe that IRAP has raised lower revenues (over GDP) for the financial sector which is levied a 
slightly higher IRAP rate than the rest of the economy.  
45 
Data are sourced from the OECD Revenues Statistics 2012, where IRAP revenues are recorded under 
heading 6000 for Italy. See OECD, “Revenue Statistics, OECD Publishing, (2013).  
46 
G. Arachi and A. Zanardi, “La Riforma del Finanziamento delle Regioni Italiane: Problemi e 
Proposte”, Econpubblica working paper no. 65, Universita’ Bocconi, Milano, 1999.  
47
 On this point see, also, IMF, “A fair and substantial contribution by the financial sector – Final 
Report for the G-20”, (June 2010), pp. 19-21.  
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
IRAP revenues (% GDP) 
12 
 
Macroeconomic impact of an FTT 
 
The 2011 IA initially forecasted that the FTT would reduce annual real GDP by 1.76 
per cent in the long run. After considering some mitigating effects,
48
 the same IA cuts 
such estimates to 0.54 per cent in the best case scenario.
49
 The estimations are then 
almost halved in the 2013 IA to a 0.28 reduction in annual real GDP in the long-term.  
 
The first point to keep in mind when reading these estimates is that, as the 
Commission notes “[a]s this new model makes a series of stylized assumptions, for 
instance about the functioning of financial markets, the financing of business etc., its 
numerical results have to be interpreted with some caution; they present tendencies 
rather than precise values.”50 Therefore, we should not accord these estimates with 
more weight than they deserve. 
 
This is self-evident when considering that the negative impact of the FTT on real 
GDP has been cut from 1.76 to 0.28 per cent, which is a 1.5 per cent revision in GDP 
terms. This is a significant change attained through same debatable assumptions. For 
example, the first reduction in the estimates from 1.76 to 0.54 per cent has been 
achieved assuming that bank lending and retained earnings are ring-fenced and 
therefore not affected by the FTT. As explained later on, this is not a plausible 
assumption.  
 
The final reduction of the estimates from 0.54 to 0.28 per cent is achieved through 
two assumptions. First, it is assumed that only 30 per cent of investment in the 
economy is financed by equity and therefore that only 30 per cent of total investment 
is affected by the FTT. The 2011 IA assumed that 50 per cent of investment was 
affected by the FTT. Second, the FTT rate used is lower (0.14 per cent) than the FTT 
rate applied in the previous version of the model (0.2 per cent).
51
  
  
More generally, no single point estimate is reliable in a forecasting exercise of this 
kind. Point estimates are a powerful tool for politicians, especially if they are small or 
big enough to suit their arguments; however they are treated with extreme caution by 
informed observers. For this reason, institutions such as the Bank of England produce 
confidence intervals for their estimates of GDP growth so that the reader is fully 
                                                        
48
 Mitigating effects include, for example, the exclusion of primary markets, the assumption that 
transactions done by financial institutions represent 85 per cent of all transactions, and that bank 
lending and retained earnings are ring-fenced (see box on mitigating effects in 2011 IA Vol. 1, above 
fn. 2, p. 51).   
49
 The best-case scenario materialises when all mitigating factors occur simultaneously.  
50
 2011 IA Vol. 1, above fn. 2, p. 51. At p. 51 the IA also states: “[t]hese features of the tax are not 
necessarily well taken into account in the modelling of the macroeconomic effects and the impact of 
this specific design on the macroeconomic effects is therefore of interest. There is no available model 
to assess these effects and the channels through which they impact macroeconomic variables. The only 
available approach is therefore to proxy the effects, at the cost of scientific rigour and with the large 
caveats and uncertainties that such an exercise may carry.”  
51 
As Oxera note, the FTT rate used in the 2011 IA varies in different parts of the assessment. The rate 
used to derive macroeconomic predictions is 0.2 per cent (2011 IA Vol. 16, above fn. 2, p. 37). Oxera, 
“What would be the economic impact of the proposed financial transaction tax on the EU? Review of 
the European Commission’s economic impact assessment”, (December 22, 2011), p. 5. 
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aware that the forecast can vary according to the different parameters assumed in the 
forecasting model. The IAs do not systematically investigate and discuss such 
confidence intervals for their estimates; furthermore, it is telling that the variation in 
the forecast reported by the IAs is always in the same direction: the negative effect of 
the FTT on GDP just gets smaller and smaller.  
 
As the Commission itself admits, their model makes some simplifying assumptions. 
Had the economy been modelled in a slightly more sophisticated way, the predictions 
of the effects of the FTT on GDP could have been bleaker. Crucially, the 
Commission’s analysis does not investigate avoidance or relocation as the model is 
one of a closed economy, it does not model the banking system, nor does it include 
the derivatives market.
52
 As discussed above, relocation and avoidance are matters of 
very great concern for an FTT which is not implemented globally, and, therefore, 
their absence in the model is significant.
53
 The choice of not modelling the banking 
sector
54
 (or any other financial intermediary) is a peculiar one as about three fourths 
of firms’ financial needs within the Euro area are satisfied by the banking sector.55 
Any tax that affects the banking system will also affect the real economy. Also, the 
model used in the IAs excludes derivatives, although the authors of the model admit 
that “derivatives account for a large share of transactions in real-world financial 
markets today”56 and the Commission itself plans to raise about EUR 21 billion from 
taxing derivatives (this amounts to over 60 per cent of the total forecasted EUR 34 
billion in FTT revenues).  
 
The model also fails to consider the potential changes to financial markets resulting 
from the tax, despite the fact that these could be of great significance, and, indeed, are 
taken into account by the Commission in the calculations of the revenues the FTT is 
expected to raise. When discussing the impact of the FTT beyond the model used, the 
2013 IA acknowledges that some financial activities will become uneconomic and 
therefore, they will disappear or will be curtailed substantially. The list is so long that 
the FTT seems to have the potential to create one of the largest structural breaks in 
financial history. The list includes repos transactions, high frequency trading, delta 
hedging, and the current form of brokerage activities where brokers trade in their own 
name and in their own account. The Commission assumes that the substantial 
reduction of these market segments will not harm growth as such activities are 
considered to have little economic value. Such view is not in line with empirical 
evidence which, at best is still mixed.
57
 If entire markets disappear, it is highly 
unlikely that there will not be any detrimental effects on growth. For example, repos 
                                                        
52
 “First, there is no derivative market in the model and it is assumed that a STT [securities transaction 
tax] is effectively implementable and enforceable. Therefore, the model cannot be used to answer 
questions about the taxation of derivatives; it cannot be used either to study changes in the market 
structure…[s]econd, we use a closed-economy model. This does not allow us to assess cross-border 
capital mobility and the relocation effects of the STT neither.” 2011 IA Vol. 16, above fn. 2, p. 41.  
53 
See section 2.1 (b)(ii) above.   
54
 R. Raciborski, J. Lendvai and L. Vogel, “Securities Transaction Taxes: Macroeconomic Implications 
in a General-Equilibrium Model”, European Economy, Economic Papers 450. (March 2012), p. 7. 
55
 M. Draghi, “The euro, monetary policy and reforms”, LUISS Guido Carli University, Rome, (May 6, 
2013). This is available at: <http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130506.en.html>. 
56
 Raciborski, Lendvai and Vogel, above fn. 54, p. 8 (emphasis added). 
57
 Oxera, “Analysis of European Commission staff working document on the proposed Financial 
Transaction Tax”, (May 20, 2013).  
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are a significant source of funding for the European banking system, especially after 
the onset of the financial crisis when banks have often used government bonds for 
refinancing their activities through a repo transaction. The disappearance of the repo 
market would almost certainly increase the cost of funding for banks and 
consequently increase the cost of capital for the entire economy with a negative effect 
on GDP. Indeed, in a leaked document the participating MS raised very serious 
concerns about the impact of the FTT on the repo market and hence on the economy: 
 
“[r]egarding the low maturity of the repo operations on sovereign bonds 
market (more than two thirds of repo operations on sovereign bonds have a 
maturity lower than three days), the tax will induce an additional cost that is 
not sustainable for the market participants, i.e. companies and member states 
which need to manage properly their cash in a secure environment. The 
extinction of the market will negatively affect the sovereign bonds market and 
by consequence will rise the government funding costs. Repo operations are 
very useful for managing the treasury liquidity and the disappearance of this 
market combined by the lack of viable alternatives will induce serious 
problems about risk management. The problem also holds for banks in 
managing their marginal liquidity and might cause both higher financial costs 
on the real economy and financial stability issues.”58  
  
A prudent approach to tax policy would require the Commission to gather more 
evidence before implementing tax measures which, by the word of the Commission 
itself, will wipe out entire segments of the current financial markets. If that is the 
case, at least the Commission should have attempted to model such a large change in 
the structure of financial markets.  
 
Overall, some of the fundamental channels through which the FTT can affect the 
economy are not taken into account by the Commission’s calculations. The study thus 
abstracts from fundamentally important problems, raising questions as to the utility of 
its predictions for policy analysis.   
 
After presenting the estimate in the 2013 IA, the Commission discusses a few broader 
issues which, it argues, once taken into account would paint an even less negative 
picture. For example, the IA argues that by using the proceeds of the FTT to cut other 
distortive taxes or by using FTT proceeds for productive spending, the negative effect 
of the FTT on GDP will be reduced. However, one notes here that any positive impact 
would be related to the reduction of other distortive taxes and to the spending of the 
revenues and not to the manner in which those revenues are raised, that is through the 
FTT.  
 
The 2013 IA also argues that FTT proceeds could be used to consolidate public 
finances, especially in countries with high debt-to-GDP ratios, and this would reduce 
the harmful effect of the FTT on the economy. This argument, and the Commission’
s concern with public debt, does not sit easily with its proposal to levy the FTT on 
                                                        
58
 “Implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of Financial Transaction Tax Questions to the 
Commission from the working level”, p. 3. This leaked document can be found at: 
<http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/Pdfs/2013FTTnonpaper.pdf>. 
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government bonds as this will certainly increase the cost of servicing public debt, 
even if primary markets are exempt. This is accepted by the Commission and it even 
provides an estimate of this cost, although it does so in a very questionable way. In its 
2013 IA it first provides an estimate that the FTT would increase the cost of capital 
for member states by about 0.07 per cent, equating to  EUR 3.85 billion for the eleven 
participating countries. It then notes that these estimates do not take into account 
certain mitigating circumstances
59
 which it argues, if one estimated them to half the 
modelled predicted increase in the cost of capital, would bring it down to less than 
EUR 2 billion.
60
 The Commission does not justify the assumption that these 
mitigating factors could have an effect of this magnitude. The unsatisfactory nature of 
these estimates was also commented on by the participating MS who in the leaked 
document mentioned above noted “[t]he [2013 IA] is not fully clear on how the 
taxation on government bonds would interact with the cost of national debt and 
whether at the overall level of the 11 MS the negative effect of the increase of the cost 
of national debts could be counterbalanced by the revenues of the FTT. In particular, 
it is not clear… how the figures indicated in the impact assessment are calculated; in 
particular, it is not clear how the Commission estimated the 2bn euro related to the 
mitigating effects, as well as more clarifications would be requested on the calculation 
of the 0.07 per cent increase of the public budgets and on the revenues from bonds.” 
They thus asked the Commission if it could give evidence of such estimates.
61
   
 
 
Finally, the IA 2013 suggests that the FTT could help redistribute resources for a 
fairer income distribution and that this could lead to higher growth, for example 
through fewer strike actions. The argument is clearly unconvincing not solely because 
of the naïve statement about strikes but more importantly, because there is no 
evidence that the FTT will in fact be able to significantly affect redistribution nor 
does the Commission report any literature discussing the evidence on the relationship 
between growth and redistribution. The link between the FTT and the positive impact 
on GDP through a reduction in strikes is tenuous at best, and one is surprised to find it 
being made in an official Commission publication.   
 
 
Efficiency: FTT vs FAT 
 
Of course, with the exception of lump-sum taxes, all taxes distort economic behaviour 
and therefore affect GDP and create deadweight losses or excess burdens. In other 
words, raising revenues through taxes imposes a cost on taxpayers and society 
because taxes distort economic decisions.
62
 For example, taxes on the return to 
investment increase the cost of capital and therefore reduce investment which in turn 
reduces GDP. Because of lower investment, society suffers a loss of welfare. Part of 
this loss will be recovered through the revenues collected by the extra tax; another 
                                                        
59
 2013 IA, above fn. 8, p. 27.  
60
 2013 IA, above fn. 8, pp. 27-28.  
61
 “Implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of Financial Transaction Tax Questions to the 
Commission from the working level”, above fn. 58, p. 3. 
62
 A. J. Auerbach and J. Hines, “Taxation and economic efficiency” in A. J. Auerbach and M. 
Feldstein (eds.), Handbook of Public Economics, (2002, Elsevier) edition 1, volume 3, chapter 21, pp. 
1347-1421. 
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part will simply be lost. This is the deadweight loss. The challenge of designing an 
optimal tax system is to keep the deadweight loss to a minimum. Hence, revenues for 
the provision of public goods should be raised through the least distortive taxes, that 
is, taxes that do not trigger large changes in agents’ economic behaviour.  
 
It is sobering to note that using the figures provided by the IAs, Oxera
63
 estimates that 
the Commission’s calculations imply that “in order to raise  EUR 1 of FTT revenue, 
the European economy could be expected to sacrifice EUR 2 in economic activity” 
and that with the assumption of an average ratio of total tax revenues over GDP of 40 
per cent across European economies, “80% of the EUR 34 billion estimated revenues 
would be lost owing to the negative impact [of the FTT] on other tax sources.”  These 
calculations, although approximations show that the FTT is not a particularly efficient 
way of raising revenues.  
 
Indeed, it is unlikely that an FTT-type tax belongs to the set of taxes which are least 
distortive. The FTT is likely to trigger both large real responses (substitution of taxed 
assets with non-taxed equivalents) and, as discussed above large avoidance behaviour 
(variation in the timing of transactions, relocation of entities and activities). This will 
reduce trade in the FTT zone. Despite the efforts of the Commission to design the 
FTT so as to minimize real responses and avoidance, the FTT tax base will remain 
very mobile, especially if London, one of the strongest global financial centres is 
outside the scope of the tax.     
 
Taxes such as the FTT which are levied on transactions between economic agents are 
particularly distortive as they distort economic decisions and therefore reduce output. 
It would then be more efficient to tax output directly.
64
 On the other hand, taxes on 
pure rents
65
 do not distort economic decisions as they are levied on the excess return 
that a resource generates relative to its next-best use.
66
 The IMF has proposed an FAT 
which in its type 2 and type 3 versions should be levied on rents so not to be 
distortive.
67
 In reality, it is difficult to identify and tax rents precisely so an FAT will 
still be distortive but certainly to a lesser extent than a tax directly levied on 
transactions. For these reasons, overall, the FAT is likely to extract the same level of 
tax revenue from the financial sector at a lower cost to the economy as a whole. 
 
In line with these considerations, the Commission recognises that there are 
alternatives to the FTT. In particular, the Commission acknowledges the superiority 
of an FAT-type tax in terms of efficiency. The IA 2011 states that: 
 
“[i]n fact, empirically the reaction to tax increases seems to be stronger for 
transactions than for FDI and profits in the financial sector, pointing to 
                                                        
63
 Oxera, above fn. 57, p. 2.  
64
 IMF, above fn. 47, p. 19.  
65 
Rents can be defined as the extra return to productive factors such as labour and capital above the 
minimum return required in a competitive economy. 
66
 J. Mirrlees, S. Adam, T. Besley, R. Blundell, S. Bond, R. Chote, M. Gammie, P. Johnson, G. Myles 
and J. Poterba, “Tax by Design: the Mirrlees Review”, (the Mirrlees Review), (September 2011, 
OUP), p. 31.  
67
 IMF, above fn. 47. 
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potential higher risks of erosion of the tax base of the FTT compared to the 
FAT.” 
 
The Commission’s argument on the smaller elasticity of profits and investment should 
be supplemented by the very simple observation that the tax base of an FAT includes 
the cost of the labour force. This component is certainly much less mobile than 
financial transactions.    
 
 The 2011 IA investigates the characteristics of an FAT and of an FTT and concludes:  
 
“[t]he analysis of macroeconomic impacts (and the relocation issues 
mentioned above) suggests that the economic distortions related to raising 
revenue could be lower with a FAT compared to an FTT. Model simulations 
indicate that the short-term effect of a 5% FAT on GDP could be limited to 
around 0.10% while the long-term effect is simulated to reach about half a per 
cent (deviation of GDP from its long-run baseline), against annual tax 
revenues of around 0.2% of GDP. On the other hand, a stylised transaction tax 
on securities (STT), where it is assumed that all investment in the economy 
are financed with the help of securities (shares and bonds) at 0.1% is 
simulated to cause output losses (i.e. deviation of GDP from its long- run 
baseline level) of up to 1.76% in the long run, while yielding annual revenues 
of less than 0.1% of GDP.”68 
 
According to the analysis, therefore, from a GDP perspective the FAT dominates the 
FTT.
69
 Obviously, these results have to be seen in the light of the macroeconomic 
models used to derive them. The limits in the model used for the FTT have been 
discussed above. Also, as discussed above, some parameters of this model have been 
changed since this conclusion was reached. Setting that to one side, one notes a more 
fundamental problem with this comparison: the rates of the two tax instruments 
discussed would not generate the same tax revenues. Given different predicted tax 
revenues and differential negative effects on GDP, it is very hard to compare the 
instruments in a meaningful way. Interpreting these results is made even more 
difficult by the fact that the assessments of the FAT and the FTT are based on two 
completely different macroeconomic models.  
 
An evidence-based tax policy would require the Commission to carry out a thorough 
study of the effects of an FTT versus the FAT, assuming the same amount of revenues 
for both taxes. This would allow for a meaningful comparison of the distortive effects 
of the two levies on the economy.   
 
 
(iv) Incidence 
                                                        
68
 2011 IA Vol.1, above fn. 2, 33. 
69
 These calculations and the comparisons between the FTT and the FAT are carried out using the 
forecast that the FTT will reduce GDP by 1.76 per cent in the long run. As mentioned above, such 
forecast has been reduced first to 0.54 per cent and then to 0.28 per cent. Even a 0.28 per cent reduction 
in GDP is larger than the forecasted reduction in GDP due to an FAT. Once again, it should be noted 
that point estimates per se are questionable and that a confidence interval for such points should be 
provided.      
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The IMF and the Mirrlees review noted that the FTT’s real burden may fall largely on 
final consumers rather than the earnings in the financial sector.
70
 Along the same 
lines, the 2011 IA concludes: 
 
“[a]s far as the FTT is concerned, a large part of the burden would fall on 
direct and indirect owners of traded financial instruments. Moreover, levying 
the tax on secondary markets generates cascading effects, which might have 
non-transparent consequences, and thus make incidence more complex. In 
fact, if business transactions are non-exempt, the tax will be cascading through 
the production process and affect the price of non-financial products and 
services.”71 
 
If this is the case, it would raise serious doubts about the 2011 Proposal’s claim that 
private households and SMEs [small and medium size enterprises] not actively 
investing in financial markets “would hardly be affected.”72 
 
Clearly, the incidence of a tax is of great importance, and taxes which are more likely 
to fall on their intended target are to be preferred. The economic burden of the FAT, 
in particular the FAT types 2 and 3, is much more likely to fall where it is intended to 
fall. This is because the FAT taxes excessive wages and profits generated in the 
financial sector. The possibilities and the incentives to pass on the tax are more 
restricted in this case. 
 
  
3.2. Creating appropriate disincentives for transactions that do not enhance the 
efficiency of financial markets thereby complementing regulatory measures aimed at 
avoiding future crises.  
 
Whilst this objective might give the impression that the FTT will deal with known 
causes of financial crises, it certainly does not target any of the accepted causes of the 
recent crisis, such as excessive leverage and insufficient liquidity coverage. These 
known causes of the past crisis could be targeted through other corrective taxes such 
as bank levies along the lines suggested by the IMF or taxes on very short-term 
liabilities. 
 
As this objective makes clear, the FTT is meant to target short-term trading, in 
particular high frequency trading (HFT) which is certainly an issue currently worrying 
regulators.
73
 Therefore, the basic thrust of the argument is that HFT has a negative 
effect on financial markets, and, therefore, by adopting the FTT HFT will be reduced 
and, consequently, so will the probability of a future crisis. This is a compelling 
argument at a time when the painful consequences of a financial crisis are still being 
felt and, in fact, proponents of the FTT have employed the argument repeatedly.  
 
                                                        
70
 IMF, above fn. 47 at p. 20 and The Mirrlees Review, above fn. 66, p. 153. 
71
 2011 IA Vol.1, above fn. 2, p. 53. 
72
 2011 Proposal, above fn. 5, p. 5. 
73
 See, for example, A. Haldane, “The race to zero”, speech given on July 8, 2011   (emphasis added). 
This is available at: <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2011/068.htm>.  
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What evidence does the Commission present on the negative effect of this form of 
trading on financial markets? Surprisingly, the Commission’s evidence actually 
acknowledges the questionable foundations of this objective. The 2011 IA noted that 
“the empirical economic literature is still rather inconclusive on effects from this 
trading form in terms of increased volatility or price deviations”.74 In a consultation 
document on the review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), 
the Commission noted “[e]xisting evidence is inconclusive about the impact of HFT 
on market efficiency”.75 Indeed, some studies have found that HFT improved market 
efficiency through tighter spreads and increased liquidity.
76
 
The point here is not that HFT does not raise legitimate concerns. The flash crash of 6 
May 2010 was a warning call that must be heeded and it is imperative that systems 
and processes are in place to address these concerns. In fact, this is being done at an 
EU level through regulation. The point here is that the evidence on the effects of HFT 
which is necessary to support the Commission’s objective is inconclusive, as the 
Commission’s itself recognises. 
 
A significant project on the The Future of Computer Trading in Financial Markets, 
which was recently carried out under the agies of the UK Department of Trade 
Innovation and Skill, and which involved leading academics from around the world 
concluded: 
 
“CBT (computer based trading) is now the reality in asset markets. 
Technology has allowed new participants to enter, new trading methods to 
arise and even new market structures to evolve. Much of what has transpired in 
markets is for the good: liquidity has been enhanced, transactions costs have 
been lowered and market efficiency appears to be better, or certainly no worse. 
The scale of improvements may be fairly small and, in the short term, they 
may have been obscured by the background of a very poor performance by 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
economies and stock market indexes in particular. However, there are issues 
with respect to periodic illiquidity, new forms of manipulation and potential 
threats to market stability due to errant algorithms or excessive message traffic 
that must be addressed. Regulatory changes in practices and policies will be 
needed to catch up to the new realities of trading in asset markets. Caution 
must be exercised to avoid undoing the many advantages that the high 
                                                        
74
 2011 IA Vol. 1, above fn. 2, p. 16. 
75
 European Commission, ‘Public Consultation: review of the markets in financial instruments directive 
(MiFID)’, (December 14, 2010), (emphasis added). This is available at 
<www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/mifid/consultation_paper_en.pdf>. 
76
 See the literature reviewed in Foresight, “The Future of Computer Trading in Financial Markets – 
Final Project Report” (The Government Office for Science, London, 2012), available at  
<http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/foresight/docs/computer-trading/12-1086-future-of-computer-trading-
in-financial-markets-report.pdf>. The Commission’s consultation paper on MiFID, cited above at fn. 
75, continues “[S]ome studies suggest that HFT using market making and arbitrage strategies has 
added liquidity to the market, reduced spreads and helped align prices across markets. However, the 
average transaction size has decreased considerably and some participants question the value of the 
additional liquidity provided. They argue there may be improved liquidity for investors who trade 
retail-size orders but it is now more difficult for institutional investors to execute large orders. Also, 
there are different views about whether HFT increases or reduces market volatility.” 
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frequency world has brought. Technology will continue to affect asset markets 
in the future, particularly as it relates to the ultra-fast processing of news into 
asset prices.”77 
 
The point here is that on the basis of the current evidence the reduction of HFT 
simply cannot be portrayed as an unambiguously desirable goal as the Commission 
has done.  
 
Not only does the Commission’s evidence raise questions about this objective, it also 
raises questions on the use of a transaction tax to obtain it: 
 
“[t]he short-term trading the STT is meant to eliminate is not proven to be 
detrimental to price recovery. Neither is there a clear link between short-term 
trading and long-run cycles of asset mispricing (bubbles). On the contrary, the 
instruments which led to the 2008 financial crisis do not belong to the set of 
frequently traded instruments. Moreover, asset bubbles have historically also 
occurred in markets with high transaction costs (real estate), suggesting that a 
low-rate STT will not prevent them in the future”.78 
 
Again, therefore, even if evidence were conclusive that high frequency trading is 
harmful, the Commission’s evidence does not make the case for an FTT being the 
best instrument to reduce it. Indeed, more generally, the FTT does not discriminate 
between “good” and “bad” transactions, and so whilst it might act as a disincentive 
for transactions that do not enhance market efficiency it will also act as a disincentive 
for transactions that do. The concerns generated by HFT are better addressed through 
targeted regulation.  
 
3.3. Avoiding a fragmentation of the internal market that might be caused by 
uncoordinated tax measures of the member states 
 
Uncoordinated tax measures adopted by member states lead to a fragmentation of the 
internal market, thus making this a reasonable objective. However, it must be pointed 
out that uncoordinated tax measures are the rule and not the exception within the EU. 
Indeed, around the time the FTT debate commenced at an EU level, uncoordinated 
bank levies were being introduced in thirteen member states,
79
 leading to a 
fragmentation of the internal market and double taxation, however the Commission 
did not attempt to address this issue through a harmonizing directive. It is not clear 
why the Commission finds a need to address uncoordinated taxes in the financial 
sector of one type (FTT) but not another (bank levy). This unexplained selectivity, in 
and of itself, does not undermine the objective, however, it does give rise to questions 
about where this objective ranked in terms of importance in the Commission’s mind. 
It appears undoubtedly true that this objective was not the driving objective behind 
these proposals.   
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Furthermore, this objective must now be viewed from the perspective of enhanced 
cooperation. The introduction of the FTT will remove distortions of competition 
amongst participating MS (other than those created by different rates). However, it is 
not evident that the level of distortion within the Internal Market as a whole will be 
reduced since the national FTTs currently in place are much narrower than the 
proposed FTT and the FTTs in the seven non-participating MS will remain in place. 
It is not at all evident that the overall level of distortion within the Internal Market as 
a whole will be less than it currently is once these five (possibly rising to six) narrow 
national FTTs are replaced with a much broader FTT in the eleven participating MS. 
The 2013 IA recognises that double taxation will arise as a result of the proposed 
FTT, whenever the transaction is also subject to a national FTT of a non-participating 
MS. For example, if a German bank sells shares in a UK company to a French bank, 
the FTT will be due in Germany and France and stamp duty will be due in the UK. 
The 2013 IA states that “these potential occurrences of double taxation should 
constitute only a tiny fraction of transactions for which the common system of FTT is 
designed”,80 and provides some back-of-the-envelope calculations on the potential 
double taxation as a result of the proposed FTT’s interaction with UK stamp duty. 
This might be so, and one acknowledges data issues, however a more comprehensive 
estimate for the size of this problem would have been preferable.   
 
3.4. Paving the way towards a global introduction of the tax  
 
Regarding this point the Commission argues:  
 
“[t]he present proposal also substantially contributes to the ongoing 
international debate on financial sector taxation and in particular to the 
development of an FTT at a global level. … The present proposal 
demonstrates how an effective FTT can be designed and implemented, 
generating significant revenue. This should pave the way towards a 
coordinated approach with the most relevant international partners.”81 
 
The EU Commission is keen on setting an example for how a tax on financial 
transactions could be implemented. The experience of the eleven participating MS 
would serve as an incentive for other jurisdictions to follow and also introduce an 
FTT. The authors believe that the Commission may instead be setting the exact 
opposite incentives for non-FTT states.  
 
The UK, the US and other countries have been adamant in saying that they are not 
interested in adopting an FTT. The introduction of an FTT in a subset of EU Member 
States would seem to provide other states with incentives not to adopt the tax because 
non-participating MS would benefit from the relocation of entities and activity away 
from states which introduce the tax. Therefore, the soundness of this objective is at 
least questionable.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
Overall, the FTT proposed the Commission raises a number of concerns. Whilst 
some of its objectives are reasonable, others are questionable. More importantly, 
the evidence provided by the Commission itself does not support the FTT as the 
instrument which is best suited to achieve them.   
In the light of the Commission’s own IAs the writers can only conclude that more 
targeted and more efficient instruments should and could be used to achieve these 
objectives. These include a levy on banks’ balance sheets which would make 
financial institutions pay taxes somewhat related to the implicit bailout guarantee 
which they enjoy, an FAT to tax excessive rents in the financial sector, and 
various forms of regulation. The Commission expended considerable time and 
energy on producing the best possible evidence in support of an FTT. That this is 
the evidence it produced is perhaps the most damning indictment for the FTT.  
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